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2 It is a matter of fact that the population to the south of the Turkish – Iraqi border consists of tribes and people 
who are related to those who are Turkish citizens to the north. As part of the Ottoman Empire there was no 
border that sharply divided southern Turkey from Northern Iraq. Consequently, with the Turkish – Iraqi border 
several related families were left on both sides of the border. Hence, any military incursion of Turks in north of 
Iraq risks the welfare of many who are related with Turkish citizens, which in turn undermines the popularity of 
such a move in the southeastern parts of the country.  Their elected representatives also reflect the same mood in 
the TBMM. On March 1, 2003 it seemed as if they were able filed enough votes to forestall Turkey from moving 
with the U.S. The legislative vote also occurred in a political milieu where the AKP Cabinet was split over the 
vote, while some Ministers openly declared their opposition to their government’s bill.  The Turkish Armed 
Forces also demonstrated trepidation and even anxiety over the placement of more than 60,000 U.S. troops on 
Turkish territory before the vote. Therefore, it was a vote in which party discipline mattered little, and the 
deputies of the TBMM voted without taking heavy political risk.  
3 For two different and contrasting interpretations of the AKP see Yüksel Taşkın, “Muhafazakarlığın Uslanmaz 
Çocuğu: Reaksiyonerlik”, in no editor, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık (vol. 5), (Istanbul: 
Iletişim Yayinlari, 2003): 211 -214, and Sultan Tepe, “Religious Parties and Democracy: A Comparative 
Assessment of Israel and Turkey,” Democratization, Vol.12, No.3, (June 2005), pp.294 - 300 and for an analysis 
of recent resurgence of Conservatism in Turkey and the role of the AKP in it see Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Politics of 









CHP SHP HP DSP ANAP MDP DYP++ MHP RP/FP+ AKP 
Elections  % % % % % % % % % % 
1983 Vote   30.5  45.1 23.3     
 Seat   29.2  52.8 17.7     
1987 Vote  24.4  --- 36.3  19.9  ---  
 Seat  22.0  --- 64.9  13.1  ---  
1991 Vote  20.6  --- 24.0  27.2  16.7(*)  
 Seat  19.7  --- 25.7  39.7  13.1(*)  
1995 Vote 10.7   14.6 19.6  19.2  21.4  
 Seat 8.9   13.8 24.0  24.5  28.7  
1999 Vote ---   22.2 13.2  12.0 18.0 15.4  
 Seat ---   24.7 15.6  15.5 23.5 20.2  
2002 Vote 19.4  --- --- ---  --- ---  34.3 
 Seat 32.4  --- --- ---  ---- ---  66.0 
2007 Vote 20.9 --- --- n.a. n.a.  --- 14.3  46.5 
 Seat 20.4(**) --- --- n.a. n.a.  --- 12.9  62.0 
Note: Only those parties that could win enough votes to go over the ten percent national threshold and gain representation in 
the National Assembly are included in the Table.  Seats refer to the percentage of seats obtained by the corresponding party 
in the National Assembly in the immediate aftermath of general elections. Empty cells refer to the non-existence of the 
corresponding party in question. Independent candidates who won seats in the National Assembly are not shown in the Table. 
(*) These cells refer to the Welfare Party Alliance, which includes RP, Nationalist Work Party (MÇP), which later was 
converted into the MHP, and Reformist Democracy Party (IDP), which is now the Nation Party (MP). 
CHP = Republican People's Party (left-of-center, secular); MHP = Nationalist Action Party (ultra-nationalist, anti-
Communist); ANAP = Motherland Party (right-of-center, liberal/conservative); HP = Populist Party (praetorian, left-of-
center); MDP = Nationalist Democracy Party (praetorian, right-of-center); RP = Welfare Party (Islamist, “National 
Outlook”); SHP = Social Democratic Populist Party (left-of-center, secular); DYP = True Path Party (right-of-center, 
nationalist, conservative); DSP = Democratic Left Party (left-of-center, nationalist), AKP =Justice and Development Party 
(conservative, leadership from political Islamist background).  
(+) FP = Virtue Party in the 1999 elections, which was more or less the continuation of the RP under a different name, after 
the former was banned by the Constitutional Court. The FP was also banned, and the AKP and Felicity Party (SP, Sunni 
Islamist,) were established in 2001 to replace the FP. 
Blank cells indicate that the party represented in the column had not been in existence at the time of the corresponding 
national election. 
(**) This figure includes the seats won by the DSP candidates, who ran on the CHP ticket, and upon election split ranks with 
the CHP.  
n.a. Not applicable, for the corresponding parties opted not to participate in the 22 July, 2007 general election. 
++ DYP tried to merge with ANAP right before the 22 July, 2007 general elections under the title of the Democrat Party 
(DP). The merger failed, but in the meantime the DYP was closed up and in its place Democrat Party (DP) was founded. 
 
Source: Kalaycioglu, 1999: 48. Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete) 10 November, 2002, no.: 24932; Official 









































                                                 
4 Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” in Engin D. Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-
Dor (eds.) Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems, (Istanbul: Boğaziçi 
University Press, 1975): 7-32. 
5 Nur Yalman, “Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey,” Daedalus, 102, 








































































                                                 
6 George Belknap and Angus Campbell (Winter 1952), “Political Party Identification and Attitudes toward 
Foreign Policy”, Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 15: 601 – 623; Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, Warren Miller 
(1954), The Voter Decides,  (Evanston, Illinois: Roy Peterson); Angus Campbell et. al, The American Voter, 
(New York: John Wiley, 1960); Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, John R. Petrtocik (1976), The Changing 
American Voter,  (Cambridge, Mass., and London, England: Harvard University Press); A. Kubota and R. E. 
Ward (1970), “Family Influence and Political Socialization in Japan,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 3, no. 
2: 148 - 151. R. E. Dowse and J. Hughes, “The Family, the School and the Political Socialization Process,” 
Sociology, vol. 5, no. 1, (1971): 24 -28. E. T. Zureik, “Party Images and Partisanship among Young 
Englishmen”, The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 25, no. 2 (1974): 189 – 192, M. Kent Jennings and Richard 
G. Niemi (1974) Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence of Families and Schools, (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press): 37 – 62, 168 -177. P. A. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. 
Tetlock (1993) Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press): 179 - 205. For an earlier study of the same socialization effect in Turkey see Ersin 
Kalaycioglu and Ali Yaşar Saribay (March 1991). “İlkokul Çocuklarının Parti Tutmasını Belirleyen Etkenler”, 
Toplum ve Ekonomi, vol. 1, no: 1: 146 – 149. 
7 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Partisan Affiliations of the Turkish Voters in the 2000’s” (Unpublished paper presentated 
at the Workshop on “Turkish Elections – 2007” in Istanbul, Turkey at Istanbul Policy Center and Sabanci 






































                                                 
8 The question we posed was “Siz bugün herhangi bir siyasal partiyi tutuyor musunuz?” which translates into 
English as “As of today (currently) are you a fan of a political party?” The concept of “party identification” is 
hard to translate into Turkish, for the concept of identification does not exist in colloquial Turkish. It is possible 
to translate identification as “özdeşleşme”, which we employed in focus groups, and the standard reaction we 
received was a blank look and “buyur?” (excuse me?)  It became apparent after a few focus groups that we 
needed a concept that better communicated the phenomenon of identification and the closest we could find was 
“parti tutmak”, which has been in usage for a very long period of time, and “tutmak” connoted deep and intense 
feelings felt for an object, such as sports club. Since party identification also refers to intense positive orientation 
and strong attachment to a political party and what it stood for, we believe that “parti tutmak” functions as the 





5  AKP  729  36,1 
8  BBP  3  ,1 
 2  CHP  250  12,4 
 4  DP/DYP  57  2,8 
 3  GP  49  2,4 
 7  MHP  154  7,6 
 6  SP  19  ,9 
 1  DTP  27  1,3 
 0  Independent  685  33,9 




















                                                 
9 The smallest parliamentary party group in the current National Assembly is the Democratic Society Party (DTP), 
which consists of those deputies who got elected in eastern and southeastern Anatolia. Each one of the DTP deputies 
ran on an independent platform of Kurdish ethnic solidarity, and they ran as independent candidates. They 
established a party group after twenty of them gained representation in the Grand National Assembly. In a sense the 
DTP was not one of the parties whose ticket was presented for the examination and preference of the voters at the 
polls on July 22, 2007. There is no ground to reject that those who voted for the current deputies of the DTP in the 
National Assembly knew quite well that they would become the DTP party group in the TBMM if they win enough 
votes as independent candidates in their electoral districts. However, we have a statistical problem for in our sample 
only 27 voters (1,3 percent of the sample) declare that they identify with the DTP (see Table 3), and only 13 
respondents (0,6 percent of the sample) claim to have voted for the DTP or its predecessor HADEP and intend to 
vote for the DTP in the July 22, 2007 general elections (see Table 4). Both of these numbers are too few to render 
sufficient variance for the regression analysis to explain, and other types of statistical analysis would also be equally 
meaningless, on the one hand, and comparisons of statistical analysis on the DTP party identification with the 
findings on AKP, CHP, and MHP would also be equally meaningless, on the other.  Under the circumstances the 













































                                                 
10 Converse proposed that the more a current voter’s father identified with a political party, and the more the 
current voter in question voted the higher the chances that he or she will be identified with a political party; see 




























































































































1. Belong to a religion  ,046  ,866  ‐,184 
2. Attend mosque services to worship  ,008  ,143  ,749 
3. How religious does the R feel  ,005  ,732  ,413 
4. Freely practice religion or worship  ‐,861  ‐,039  ,038 
5. Religious people are oppressed  ,830  ,010  ,167 



































































     Table 9: Self‐placement of the Respondents on the Social Status Scale  
   Frequency  Percent 
Categories  Lowest  149 7,4 
   2  263 13,0 
   3  487 24,1 
   4  707 35,0 
   5  294 14,6 
   6  85 4,2 


























   Village  521  25,8 



























































































































                      Table 13: Factors Explaining CHP Identification: Discriminant Analysis with 
                                     Parents who had identified with the CHP / DSP, left of center parties:  
                                     Discriminant Analysis (Structure  Matrix) 


























































































                                                 
11 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Partisan Affiliations of the Turkish Voters in the 2000’s” (Unpublished paper presentated 
at the Workshop on “Turkish Elections – 2007” in Istanbu, at Istanbul Policy Center and Sabanci University, 
November 30 – December 1, 2007). 
 18
most important factors that determine the voter’s feelings of partisan affiliation 
toward those political parties. 
 
  Thirdly, cultural cleavages, such as secularism versus religiosity and Kurdish 
and Turkish ethnic identity seem to play some role in defining partisan 
characteristics of the CHP and MHP, and thus determine the voter’s feelings of 
partisan affiliation toward those parties. 
 
  Fourthly, religiosity seems to play an important role in determining partisan 
affiliations toward the AKP, though that is in the absence of any pragmatic economic 
considerations. It is a matter of fact that Sunni Islamic characteristic of the AKP plays 
a major role defining that party, though family socialization indicates that it is not 
only attracting those who come from a background of political Islam. 
